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that respect, the goal of repression is like any other mental goal that can
be carried out in many different ways.
This line of reasoning suggests that ultimately there is no barrier in
principle between psychoanalysis and other parts of psychological and
brain science. One of the dramatic events of recent years has been the
rapid dissolving of the high wall between psychology and neuro-
science, driven in large part by developments in neuroimaging. I would
expect over the next decade a similar crumbling of unneeded obstacles
between psychodynamic thought and academic science.
REFERENCES
BAARS, B.J. (1986). The cognitive revolution in psychology. New York:
Guilford Press.
——— (1988). A cognitive theory of consciousness. New York: Cambridge
University Press. 
——— (1996). In the theater of consciousness: The workspace of the mind.
New York: Oxford University Press.
The Wright Institute
2728 Durant Avenue 
Berkeley, CA  94704
E-mail: Baars@cogsci.berkeley.edu
Linda A.W. Brakel
It is important for the future of our discipline to relate psychoanalysis
to the cognitive/neurosciences and the contemporary philosophy of mind.
Mark Solms’s target article, however, while manifestly championing
these goals suggests a program that if implemented would drive us further
into isolation from the scientific/academic world. He states that the
question asked by neuroscientists, “‘How exactly do neurobiological
processes in the brain cause consciousness?’ embodies a fundamentally
flawed conception of the nature of consciousness.” And since this
conception, flawed in Solms’s view, underlies much of current cognitive
and brain research, he implies that psychoanalysts need not be concerned
that “our discipline is very much out of step with contemporary research.”
I disagree strongly. I will show why, by identifying his failed arguments
and the erroneous conclusions to which they lead.
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WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS?
Solms’s paper was delivered originally as the second annual Charles
Fisher Memorial Lecture. Interestingly, Fisher’s work represents a view
inimical to the one Solms presents. For Fisher, psychoanalytic theory
informed cognitive investigations, and cognitive methods and techniques
were valuable in testing portions of psychoanalytic theory; he sought
theories relevant to both mind and brain. But central disagreements
notwithstanding, there are certain views regarding consciousness and
unconsciousness that are shared by Freud, Fisher, Solms, and me. I shall
address these first. The next section is devoted to my major disagreements
with Solms, and finally I will offer my own ideas on the topic.
Points of agreement. The very existence of consciousness, for
Freud, Fisher, Solms and me, implies the existence of unconsciousness
as both developmentally prior to the emergence of consciousness and
ontologically necessary as an underpinning for any particular conscious
manifestation.
“Unconsciousness” in the prior-to-consciousness sense I intend
does not primarily concern mental contents and psychological
processes that because of conflict are rendered unconscious (although
these later join the unconscious); nor does it concern various psycho-
logical/brain functions that are uninterestingly (for our purposes) non-
conscious, in the same way that our enzyme deployment in digestion is
not-and-never-to-be conscious. Instead “unconsciousness” concerns
those mental contents, processes, and functions, not yet conscious or
never to be so, that are organized largely by a set of principles different
from those of the secondary process; they are organized according to
Freud’s primary process principles.
Solms provides many quotations from Freud’s work that seem in
agreement with this, and I will add that Freud’s often misunderstood
“primal repression” fits here too. As for Fisher (1954), he believed that 
“preconscious perception is an early stage of the perceptual process,” a
stage of perception “under the control of the drives and the primary
process. . .” (p. 439). In a 1989 paper owing much to Fisher, I concluded
that his “body of work suggests that in waking adults a prior phase of
preconscious perception precedes the seemingly automatic delivery of
sensory data to the status of conscious, instantaneous, wakeful
perceptions” (1989, p. 460). So, for Freud, Fisher, Solms, and me,
consciousness is an add-on, with a primary process type organization
driven perceptually and associationally and supplemented, if never quite
supplanted, by secondary process organizations. Recently some
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experimental evidence (Brakel et al. 1996) has been provided for the
connection between consciousness and secondary process organizational
principles and unconsciousness and primary process ones. These findings
suggest that unconscious, totally subliminal similarity judgments can be
made on neutral geometric shapes and that these judgments, unlike their
conscious (supraliminal) counterparts, are based rather exclusively on
primary process type attributional features.
Points of disagreement. I have three main areas of disagreement.
(1) Solms confuses reflective consciousness and primary conscious-
ness. This is related to his misunderstanding of Searle’s view (1992)
and that of other nondualist naturalistic materialists. (2) Solms’s dis-
cussion of Kantian epistemology is severely flawed regarding Kant’s
transcendental idealism. I believe with Solms that Freud’s position on
knowledge of the unconscious is essentially an extension of Kant’s
position regarding knowledge of things-as-they-are (see Brakel 1994).
However, Solms, without ever discussing transcendental idealism, tries
to finesse important but subtly contradictory conclusions about the sub-
strate of external vs. internal perceptions by means of out-and-out con-
tradictory assumptions about that philosophical doctrine. I will explain
transcendental idealism below and attempt to demonstrate the problem.
Finally, (3) Solms never explicates how internal subjective perceptions
are differentiated from external objective perceptions, other than to talk
of different sensory modalities facing in different directions. This is at
best unsatisfying and at worst has problematic implications.
Problem 1. At first Solms seems to consider only reflective
consciousness, for otherwise he would have to acknowledge that external
perceptions too give rise to consciousness in the primary consciousness
sense in which one is conscious of some external perception. But it is
plain that Solms does not intend to restrict his discussion to reflective
consciousness. In his misappropriation of Searle’s arm pinching
experiment, Solms suddenly wants to talk about the subjectivity of one’s
visual experience, something which earlier he has mistakenly discussed
solely in terms of “objective” and “external” perception. No philosopher
(certainly not Searle) would fall for the trap Solms thinks he’s set. Searle
would not claim that the visual experience of the neural pathways, even
enhanced by MRI, are any less first-person subjective than is the pain of
the pinched arm. The brain activities that have had a causal role in the
pain or in the visual image are third-person, and not necessarily our view
of these activities. This is the point Solms misses with this false analogy:
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“Brain processes can no more cause conscious experiences than a flash
of lightning can cause a clap of thunder. . . . The two modalities of
perception . . . are both caused by something else. . . .” Solms’s mistake
here is considering “modalities of perception” to be the only kind of brain
process, instead of realizing that the “something else” which he admits
is causal is also a type of brain process.
Problem 2. There is a larger mistake; it concerns Solms’s handling
of Kant’s transcendental idealism. The dilemma of transcendental
idealism goes like this: Given that we can know the external world and
our internal world only through our human capacities for knowledge,
we can know only things-as-they-appear. But we cannot get from things-
as-they-appear to knowing anything about things-as-they-are. And
knowing anything about the realm of things-as-they-are includes even
such minimal knowledge as knowing (1) that in causative interaction
with our capacities, the realm of things-as-they-are yields things-as-they
appear; (2) that this realm of things-as-they-are exists in a form different
from that of the realm of things-as-they-appear, i.e., in a form outside
our capacities; and (3) that the things-as-they-are realm exists at all.
Early on in Solms’s account of Kant and Freud, he assumes, in contra-
diction to transcendental idealism, not only that the external natural
world exists, but that it exists independently of our understanding of it
and that it has objective causal properties. This position (which tacitly
rejects transcendental idealism) is fine, except that later on Solms seems
to have reversed himself completely. In a passage criticizing Searle’s
program, Solms now takes the opposite position, affirming transcen-
dental idealism, claiming that we can deal with the brain and other natural
world objects only as things-as-they-appear. “The flaw in Searle’s
approach,” writes Solms, “is the notion that the brain (or nervous system)
is different from all other objects that we see around us, in that it exists
as such [i.e., as having objective causal properties].” Here Solms not
only attacks Searle for regarding the brain as part of the external natural
world, but argues against anyone’s holding the view that natural objects
exist and have causal properties. In other words, Solms now takes issue
with the same position against transcendental idealism that several pages
earlier he maintained.
Solms’s dual stance on transcendental idealism has consequences
that are not merely esoteric. His contradictory theorizing undermines
the very core of his argument against theories that brain processes cause
consciousness. With this argument dismantled, his “solution” to the
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mind/body problem, namely, that there is no question of causation, can
be recognized as hollow. Unfortunately, what Solms offers instead—
that consciousness is merely the outcome of a “sense organ” operation
on unconscious brain processes—is unargued and naive.
Problem 3. Either Solms has inadequately specified how we can
make the distinction between internal subjective perceptions and external
(so-called) objective ones, or there is a circularity in his account of the
differentiation. Solms implies that it is the quality of consciousness itself,
supposedly attached to the internal registrations and not the external ones,
that marks the distinction. However, his suggestion that only subjective
internal perceptions have the quality of first-person consciousness, while
external objective perceptions do not, is circular. That is, only internal
perceptions have subjective consciousness, and perceptions are
considered internal only insofar as that property can be attributed to them.
Further, this is not only circular—it is wrong. We can certainly give a
privileged, first-person qualitative description of our particular
consciousness of visual percepts of the “external world” just as readily
as we can give such a description of our consciousness of a pain.
An account of consciousness. Shevrin (1986) has noted that “con-
sciousness” (or “conscious”) can be used to refer to two very different
phenomena. On the one hand, “consciousness” denotes a distinct
psychological state, i.e., the alert awake state, and on the other, used
with the preposition of, it is a synonym for “awareness of,” as in “I am
conscious of the dog barking.” For Shevrin the import of this distinc-
tion is great because he holds that the function of consciousness—by
which he means the “awareness of ” type—is to confer, fix, and retrieve
mental contents within their original categories of experience, e.g., as
contents of an awake perception, of a memory, or of a dream image. He
explains that unless there has been such a conscious experience of a
particular mental content, the category of that experience (i.e., percept,
image, or thought) is lost, even though the informational content might
be available. Subliminal presentations are paradigm cases, where
indeed informational content is registered, but the subject can make no
assignment as to its origins precisely because the subject was never
conscious of this content.
Much here seems right. But, as I have argued elsewhere (Brakel
1989), although consciousness (in the sense of “awareness of ”) is nec-
essary, it is not sufficient to confer, fix, and retrieve a mental content
properly within its original category of experience. A contribution from
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a function of consciousness in the other mode, the psychological state
of alert wakefulness, is needed too. I base this on the commonplace
experience of dreamers and hallucinators. While in the dream or hallu-
cinatory psychological state, people are consciously aware of many
images, percepts, and thoughts. Although within the dreaming state
these are distinguished from one another, they are almost invariably
experienced as alert awake percepts or thoughts only later, when the
correct category of experience (e.g., dream image) is assigned in the
alert wakeful conscious state.
It will be hard for Shevrin to dismiss my view, since subjects
reporting on what they are consciously aware of are almost necessarily
in an alert wakeful conscious state. But with Shevrin’s account we do
get a unified notion of consciousness as awareness of in any psycho-
logical state, a notion that includes a discrete set of functions for con-
ferring, fixing, and retrieving mental contents in their original
categories of experience. Is there any conceptual advantage in my pro-
posal that consciousness as awareness of must be joined by con-
sciousness in the alert wakeful state? I would have to maintain that in
order to properly confer, fix, and retrieve mental contents in their
original categories of experience certain functions or capacities present
only in the alert wakeful state are needed.
Such a set of capacities does suggest itself—a set that comprises
distinctly secondary-process functions. Admittedly I am speculating, but
dream states, hallucinatory states, states of daydreams and fantasies, and
even alert wakeful states in young children1 are marked by the
predominance of primary process associative thinking rather than
logically structured secondary process thinking. And as primary process
operations include primary process–based categorizing—where, for
example, penises, cigars, and fire hoses form a category, rather than pipes,
chewing tobacco, and cigars—it seems likely that correct assignment of
a mental content in its original category of experience would not be a
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1I have noted elsewhere (Brakel 1989) a striking similarity between infantile
amnesia and subliminal registrations. In both, subjects’ memory for informational
content can be demonstrated, while the source of the information, i.e., the original and
proper category of experience of the mental content, is irretrievable. But the very sim-
ilarity of these two phenomena strengthens my point that consciousness of is not suf-
ficient for fixing and retrieving such mental contents. Children, unlike subjects pre-
sented subliminal stimuli, are fully conscious of contents that later become lost owing
to infantile amnesia. Particular functions in the alert-wakeful-conscious state of the
young child are apparently not sufficiently developed to play the fixing and retriev-
ing role that their adult counterparts do.
primary process capacity either. Rather, for the correct conferring, fixing,
and retrieving of a mental content in its original category of experience
to be achieved, there must occur both an awareness of some content and
an organization of this content based on secondary process principles. If
this follows, and if secondary process principles of mental organization
indeed are consistently and reliably operative only in the state of adult
alert wakeful consciousness, my position has conceptual merit.
Concluding remarks. Although I have disagreements regarding
central issues in Solms’s article, I applaud attempts to relate psycho-
analytic theories of consciousness to those of the cognitive/neuro-
sciences and the philosophy of mind. I fear, however, that if psycho-
analysts embrace Solms’s view, with its implication that we need not
worry about the dissynchrony between psychoanalysis and the findings
and methods of current cognitive/neuroscientific research, our disci-
pline will never be enriched by, or contribute to, explorations of the
relationship between mind and brain. The view of consciousness and
unconsciousness I advance, on the other hand, is not at odds with con-
temporary cognitive research, and even admits of some independent
testing of the psychoanalytic presuppositions involved.
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